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Abstract—Quartierstrom creates a peer-to-peer marketplace
for locally generated solar power. The marketplace is imple-
mented as a smart contract on a permissioned blockchain
governed by all prosumers. Two privacy-by-design concepts are
presented which guarantee that the users individual load profile
is not leaked to any third party despite using a blockchain. The
first approach leverages UTXO based coin mixing protocols in
combination with an account-based on-chain smart contract. The
second approach relies on an off-chain smart contract running
in trusted execution environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Renewable electrical energy is increasingly produced lo-
cally in a decentralized fashion. Self-consumption of this
produced energy is incentivized in many legislations in order
to improve the profitability of renewables. However, most
prosumers currently have no possibility to influence the level
of remuneration for the energy they sell nor are they allowed
to sell directly to their neighbors. The Quartierstrom project
[1] implements a transactive energy system that manages the
exchange and remuneration of electricity between consumers,
prosumers and the utility in the absence of intermediaries.
Blockchain [2] technology was chosen to implement the de-
centralized peer-to-peer market that does not rely on a trusted
third party (TTP). Both prosumers and consumers can indicate
a price at which they are willing to sell or buy locally produced
solar energy without the intermediation of a utility or any
other TTP. Utilities still enjoy a lot of trust in most european
countries [3]. However, this trust mainly regards their integrity,
not their competence in information security matters nor the
absence of their curiousness regarding personal data.
Blockchain solutions have the potential to guarantee trans-
parency and integrity of the process along with confidentiality
and information security. Moreover, the absence of any single
point of failure improves resiliency. Finally, blockchain tech-
nology is a natural choice to endorse the bottom-up community
spirit, attractive to many customers engaging in decentralized
energy production.
A. Decentralized Energy Market
Quartierstrom implements a double auction with discrimi-
natory pricing as its market mechanism. For both, consumers
and prosumers, the smart meters transmit bids containing the
price limit determined by the individual household and the
electricity demand or supply measured by the meter. An order
book collects all bids during discrete intervals of 15 minutes
and sorts them by price: Sell bids with a lower sell price
are prioritized, and buy bids with a higher price, respectively.
Discriminatory pricing means that for each trade, the price is
derived as the mean between the buyer’s and seller’s price.
Befitting the idea of decentralization, the auction is imple-
mented as a smart contract on the blockchain. Quartierstrom is
built upon a Tendermint BFT consensus [4] with nodes running
on embedded devices [5] at the metering points in the grid.
B. Privacy Challenge
The aggregated power consumption of each individual
household is sampled every 15 minutes and placed on the
market as a bid by means of a blockchain transaction. Linking
bids for a particular participant reveals his usage profile, which
is to be considered personal data. A Nakamoto blockchain [2]
guarantees pseudo anonymity by representing each demand
and production smart meter as a public key (the public key
can be thought of as an account number in the traditional
banking sense). No association between the public key and the
household’s address or occupant’s identity is published on the
blockchain at any point in time. However, third parties may be
able to gain insights about consumer behavior, household char-
acteristics or occupancy patterns from market orders. Because
of this linkability risk, the European Blockchain Observatory
considers public keys personal data under GDPR [6].
C. Goal
Quartierstrom therefore aims at breaking the linkability
among subsequent market orders. The Quartierstrom mar-
ketplace features a public order book, therefore price and
amount of all orders are public. This transparency is desired so
every observer can verify the market’s integrity. However, the
identity of a bid’s originator does not need to be public as long
as the market can enforce settlement of successfully cleared
bids. Leveraging blockchain features, a cryptocurrency can be
used to supply the necessary funds along with a bid using
an atomic transaction. Such a cryptocurrency needs to feature
private transactions to avoid linkability of bids. As the group
of users on a market is bound by the physical dimensions
of the respective grid, k-anonymity [7] can be achieved at
best, k being the number of participants per grid region. This
paper presents two fundamentally different approaches that
were evaluated as candidates for privacy enhancements of
the Quartierstrom system. Section II approaches the problem
with cryptography, while section III leverages trusted execution
environments.
20.5.2019
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
07
94
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
0 M
ay
 20
19
II. TRANSPARENT-BID AUCTION WITH SHIELDED BID
ORIGINATORS
Quartierstrom implements a double auction by means of
a smart contract. The business logic behind this marketplace
is not further explored here. Instead, the focus is put on user
privacy in a transparent market on blockchains in general.
Orders contain a price in [cts/kWh] and the amount of
energy in [kWh] consumed or produced during the last 15
minutes. As the order is sent to the market as a blockchain
transaction, the sender has to sign the order with her private
key. Therefore, her public key is tied to the order, which leads
to unwanted information leakage as subsequent orders can be
linked to the same public key, thereby revealing consumptional
behavior.
On a blockchain, the bidder can directly supply the max-
imum value of her order together with the bid, in the form
of cryptocurrency. If her order is cleared at a lower price, the
change can be returned to the sender address. Supplying the
necessary value along with the order is the first step to unlink
orders because it makes every order binding by itself and the
market contract can settle all trades directly without knowing
the identity or an account number of the originator. However,
even if one may now use a different address for every order,
one still has to fund these addresses, thereby linking them. As
shown in [8], tracing blockchain transactions can easily reveal
a sender’s identity.
We propose to use shielded addresses to break linkabil-
ity between orders. Shielded addresses are shadow identities
unlinkable to the main addresses, which can be used to trans-
fer tokens without revealing the originators, the transaction
amount or beneficiaries. As a consequence the traceability
of blockchain transactions is prevented. Hence, shielded ad-
dresses are able to perform coin mixing [9]. Currently, the
two largest blockchains (measured by market capitalization)
implementing shielded adresses are Zcash [10] and Monero
[11]. While Zcash leverages zero-knowledge succinct non-
interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs), Monero
employs linkable ring signatures (LRS) along with one-time
public addresses.
Fig. 1 shows the proposed generic transaction flow. 0x001
may be a public address, possibly funded by an exchange and
therefore linkable to an identity. The user Bob sends funds
to a shielded address 0x002, thereby breaking the link to his
identity. For each order, Bob sends the necessary value to a
fresh unshielded address 0x003, which in turn is used to call
the smart contract to register his order.
Both Zcash and Monero use unspent-transaction-outputs
(UTXO) [2] but they don’t feature smart contracts. Ethereum
[12] on the other hand does feature smart contracts but uses
account-based transactions. Therefore, it is known who called
a smart contract as only the payload of the contract call can
be encrypted.
Quorum [13] built a hybrid blockchain featuring a modified
Zerocoin protocol along with smart contracts. While our pro-
posed concept is expected to work on Quorum, zk-SNARKS
are computationally heavy and applying such a protocol to
embedded applications like our blockchain-smart-meter ap-
pears unreasonable today. However, recent advancements in the
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Fig. 1. Shielded transactions break linkability among successive orders to
preserve user privacy.
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Fig. 2. Basic auction setup with a single trusted execution environment acting
as trusted auctioneer.
field of cryptographic primitives led to the release of JubJub
[14] enabling faster zero-knowledge proof generation with less
RAM usage.
The CryptoNote protocol [11] is considered to be more
suitable for embedded applications because no heavy com-
putation is involved. If implemented on top of Tendermint,
shielded transactions can be combined with smart contracts.
Both Zerocoin and CryptoNote risk leaking private infor-
mation when using light clients. For both protocols, every user
has to scan every block for transactions concerning himself. If
a light client queries a full node for his account balance, the full
node learns the user’s individual public keys. For Quartierstrom
this is a drawback, as pure consumers who do not sell excess
energy are equipped with cheaper light client devices.
III. OFF-CHAIN AUCTION WITH TRUSTED EXECUTION
ENVIRONMENTS
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) allow confidential
code execution inside an enclave that is secured by hardware.
Such TEEs convince third parties of the integrity and confi-
dentiality of a computation by means of remote attestation by
the hardware manufacturer. [15], [16], [17] and [18] proposed
protocols for private blockchain transactions based on Intel
SGX [19]. For embedded devices, ARM TrustZone [20] could
be leveraged. Keystone [21] develops an open source RISC V
CPU featuring a TEE which, unlike the former two, will be
formally verifiable. In any of these cases one has to trust the
device manufacturer.
Fig. 2 shows the proposed architecture for a confidential
double auction, where confidentiality is ensured by TEEs. A
prosumer’s smart meter creates an order based on the energy
measurement for the last 15-min-slot and the customer’s price
preference. It signs the order with a wallet key Kp, allowing
the auction enclave to access his pre-paid funds. The prosumer
encrypts his order with an encryption key Kc provided by the
auction enclave. Therefore, no one except the auction enclave
can decrypt the order and learn about its content or originator.
The auction enclave collects all orders in its order book
and clears the market. The auction enclave maintains a ledger
with all pre-paid account balances and settles the market
immediately. A public settlement report, signed by the enclave
key Ke, is finally broadcast to all bidders to provide price
transparency.
So far, this does not involve a blockchain at all. The
described concept could be applied using a central enclave
operator. The central operator would not be able to read any
orders or account balances. It could even manage account re-
fills supporting standard payment options. To gain a customer’s
trust, the operator should allow remote attestation by the TEE
manufacturer and the auction enclave code would have to be
open sourced and would have to be built deterministically
so anyone can build the trusted computing base (TCB) and
compare its hash to the remote attestation’s quote.
This centralized trusted computing approach already comes
with privacy benefits if compared to today’s standard meter-
to-cash process, because confidentiality and integrity of the
market are enforced by hardware. However, Quartierstrom
aims to provide a decentralized market for local communities.
Decentralizing the described market involves allowing anyone
to act as enclave operator and the settlement layer may not
rely on a trusted third party.
Fig. 3 shows a setup leveraging blockchain for a decentral-
ized registry of attested enclaves: (i) A TEE operator registers
an auction enclave by supplying a remote attestation (RA)
quote to the enclave attestation registry (ER) (on-chain). (ii)
The ER validates the RA quote and updates its registry. (iii)
All registered enclaves generate a new distributed key pair Kc
(see III-B).
A. Trusted Auctioneer Integrity
Integrity of computation is guaranteed by the TEE manu-
facturer. However, successful side-channel attacks have been
shown in [22] compromising not only confidentiality but also
integrity. To mitigate such attacks, we suggest to diversify by
running a pBFT consensus [23] among multiple TEEs from
different manufacturers. [18] proposes an incentive scheme to
balance power among different manufacturers.
B. Trusted Auctioneer Confidentiality
If more than one TEE may act as auctioneer, a shared secret
needs to be established, known to all registered enclaves but
no one else. [16] suggests to use a distributed key generation
(DKG) protocol published in [24]. Such a shared secret can
then be used to derive the encryption key pair Kc in Fig. 2. Fre-
quent renewal of the shared secret is recommended to improve
forward-secrecy in the case of future TEE vulnerabilities.
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Fig. 3. Blockchain setup with off-chain TEEs who register with a registry
contract. A DSO registers prosumers allowed to trade. Prosumers send their
orders to the blockchain in encrypted form. The enclaves may perform token
transactions on behalf of prosumers to settle the market.
C. Settlement
An auction enclave must be able to settle the market
without any interaction with the prosumer. It therefore is a
custodian of a prepaid balance on behalf of the latter. In our
decentralized scenario there is no single operator that could
offer a prepaid account topup service to the prosumers as
in the case of a centralized auctioneer. A practical approach
would be that utilities are permissioned to issue IOUs (”I owe
you”) denominated in fiat currency on behalf of prosumers
topping up their balance. A more decentralized way would be
to introduce bridges to cryptocurrency blockchains along the
ideas presented in [25].
D. Permissioned Bidder Registry
There is no way around the natural monopoly of a distri-
bution system operator (DSO). Only the DSO knows which
prosumers are connected to the same low-voltage grid and
should therefore be able to trade energy on their local market
as envisioned by Quartierstrom . The DSO also knows who
actually operates a real PV plant and of what size. Therefore,
decentralization faces its natural limits when touching physical
givens, represented by the bidder registry.
IV. RELATED WORK
The methods presented in Section II extend and concretize
the ideas of [26]. While [26] performs computations off-chain
and uses the blockchain as a log, our approach uses completely
on-chain computations for the shielded auction.
Ekiden [16] is a platform for confidentiality-preserving,
trustworthy and performant smart contracts built on TEEs. It is
a universal platform built on Tendermint and a possible option
for an implementation of a prototype.
Strain (Secure aucTions foR blockchAINs) [27] proposes a
sealed-bid auction for blockchains, leveraging zero-knowledge
proofs. The protocol, however, relies on a semi-trusted judge.
V. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the privacy challenges when imple-
menting a decentralized auction for electrical energy on a
blockchain. Two concepts have been presented that provide
confidentiality of personal data while still delivering trans-
parency of the auction process. The first approach breaks the
linkability among subsequent orders by means of either zero-
knowledge proofs or ring signatures. The second approach
leverages trusted execution environments to guarantee both
confidentiality and integrity of the auctioneer. Both approaches
can be applied to centralized and decentralized systems alike,
enhancing privacy with or without leveraging blockchain.
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